

SELinux + MAC

- Unlike Win2k ACLs, MAC enforcement requires all policies to be specified by an administrator
 - * Users cannot change these policies
- + Multi-level security: Declassified, Secret, Top-Secret, etc.
 - In MLS, only a trusted declassifier can lower the secrecy of a file
 - Users with appropriate privilege can read classified files, but cannot output their contents to lower secrecy levels


Example


- * Suppose I want to read a secret file
- * In SELinux, I transition to a secret role to do this
 - + This role is restricted:
 - Cannot write to the network
 - Cannot write to declassified files
 - * Secret files cannot be read in a declassified role
- Idea: Policies often require applications/users to give up some privileges (network) for others (access to secrets)

General principles

Secrecy (Bell-LaPadula)

- No read up, no write down
- In secret mode, you can't write a declassified file, or read top-secret data
- Integrity (Biba)
 - No write up, no read down
 - + A declassified user can't write garbage into a secret file
 - A top-secret application can't read input/load libraries from an untrusted source (reduce risk of compromise)





Role-Based Access Control

- Idea: Extend or restrict user rights with a role that captures what they are trying to do
- Example: I may browse the web, grade labs, and administer a web server
 - * Create a role for each, with different privileges
 - + My grader role may not have network access, except to blackboard
 - My web browsing role may not have access to my home directory files
 - * My admin role and web roles can't access students' labs

Roles vs. Restricted Context

- Win2k ACLs allow a user to create processes with a subset of his/her privileges
- * Roles provide the same functionality
 - But also allow a user to add privileges, such as administrative rights
- Roles may also have policy restrictions on who/when/ how roles are changed
 - * Not just anyone (or any program) can get admin privileges

The power of RBAC


- Conditional access control
- Example: Don't let this file go out on the internet
 - Create secret file role
 - No network access, can't write any files except other secret files
 - + Process cannot change roles, only exit
 - Process can read secret files
 - * I challenge you to express this policy in Unix permissions!


Roles vs. Specific Users

- * Policies are hard to write
- * Roles allow policies to be generalized
 - Users everywhere want similar restrictions on their browser
- Roles eliminate the need to re-tailor the policy file for every user
 - * Anyone can transition to the browser role

Type Enforcement

- Very much like the fine-grained ACLs we saw last time
- Rather than everything being a file, objects are given a more specific type
- ✤ Type includes a set of possible actions on the object
- + E.g., Socket: create, listen, send, recv, close
- * Type includes ACLs based on roles





- * sysctl_t /proc/sys and related files
- * sysctl_fs_t /proc/sys/fs and related files

Detailed example ping_exec_t type associated with ping binary Policies for ping_exec_t: Restrict who can transition into ping_t domain Admins for sure, and init scripts Regular users: admin can configure

- ping_t domain (executing process) allowed to:
 - Use shared libraries
 - + Use the network
 - + Call ypbind (for hostname lookup in YP/NIS)

Ping cont.

- Read certain files in /etc
- Create Unix socket streams
- * Create raw ICMP sockets + send/recv on them on any interface
- setuid (Why? Don't know)
- Access the terminal
- Get file system attributes and search /var (mostly harmless operations that would pollute the logs if disallowed)
 - + Violate least privilege to avoid modification!

Full ping policy nfile, exec_type; file_type, 20 auditallow ping_t any_socket_t:rawip_socke # Transition into this domain when you run this auto_trans(sysadm_t, ping_exec_t, ping_t) _auto_trans(initrc_t, ping_exec_t, ping_t) # Use capabilities. llow ping_t self:capability { net_raw setuid }; _shlib(ping_t) domain_access(ping_t) ig_t { etc_t resolv_conf_t }:file { getattr # Access the terminal. allow ping_t admin_tty_type:chr_file rms; nome-pty-helper.te', `allow ping_t h_t:fd use;') mg_t privfd:fd use; 4 allow ping_t self:unix_stream_socket reate_socket_perms; Let ping create raw ICMP packets. dontaudit ping_t fs_t:filesyste rawip_socket {create rocu :opt}; socket_t:rawip_socket sendto; # it tries to access /var/run dontaudit ping_t var_t:dir search

Culturally, top Linux developers care about writing a good kernel Not as much about security Different specializations Their goal: Modularize security as much as humanly possible Security folks write modules that you can load if you care about security; kernel developers don't have to worry about understanding security



by these hooks that enforce arbitrary policies
Linux also adds opaque "security" pointer that LSM can use to store security info they need in processes, inodes,

SELinux example

- + A task has an associated security pointer
- Stores current role
- * An inode also has a security pointer
- ✤ Stores type and policy rules
- * Initialization hooks for both called when created

SELinux example, cont.

✤ A task reads the inode

sockets, etc.

- + VFS function calls LSM hook, with inode and task pointer
- + LSM reads policy rules from inode
- * Suppose the file requires a role transition for read
 - * LSM hook modifies task's security data to change its role
 - * Then read allowed to proceed

Problem: Persistence

All of these security hooks are great for *in memory* data structures

✤ E.g., VFS inodes

How do you ensure the policy associated with a given file persists across reboots?

