

SELinux

Don Porter

1



MAC vs. DAC

- By default, Unix/Linux provides **Discretionary Access Control**
  - The user (subject) has discretion to set security policies (or not)
  - Example: I may 'chmod o+a' the file containing course grades, which violates university privacy policies
- **Mandatory Access Control** enforces a central policy on a system
  - Example: MAC policies can prohibit me from sharing course grades

2



SELinux

- Like the Windows 2k ACLs, one key goal is enforcing the principle of least authority
  - No 'root' user
  - Several administrative roles with limited extra privileges
  - Example: Changing passwords does not require administrative access to printers
    - The principle of least authority says you should only give the minimum privilege needed
  - Reasoning: if 'passwd' is compromised (e.g., due to a buffer overflow), we should limit the scope of the damage

3



SELinux

- Also like Win2k ACLs, a goal is to specify fine-grained access control permission to kernel objects
  - In service of principle of least authority
  - Read/write permissions are coarse
  - Lots of functions do more limited reads/write

4



SELinux + MAC

- Unlike Win2k ACLs, MAC enforcement requires all policies to be specified by an administrator
  - Users cannot change these policies
- Multi-level security: Declassified, Secret, Top-Secret, etc.
  - In MLS, only a trusted declassifier can lower the secrecy of a file
  - Users with appropriate privilege can read classified files, but cannot output their contents to lower secrecy levels

5



Example

- Suppose I want to read a secret file
- In SELinux, I transition to a secret role to do this
  - This role is restricted:
    - Cannot write to the network
    - Cannot write to declassified files
  - Secret files cannot be read in a declassified role
- Idea: Policies often require applications/users to give up some privileges (network) for others (access to secrets)

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General principles

- Secrecy (Bell-LaPadula)
  - No read up, no write down
  - In secret mode, you can't write a declassified file, or read top-secret data
- Integrity (Biba)
  - No write up, no read down
  - A declassified user can't write garbage into a secret file
  - A top-secret application can't read input/load libraries from an untrusted source (reduce risk of compromise)

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SELinux Policies

- Written by an administrator in a SELinux-specific language
  - Often written by an expert at Red Hat and installed wholesale
  - Difficult to modify or write from scratch
- Very expansive---covers all sorts of subjects, objects, and verbs

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Key Points of Interest

- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
- Type Enforcement
- Linux Security Modules (LSM)
  - Labeling and persistence

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Role-Based Access Control

- Idea: Extend or restrict user rights with a **role** that captures what they are trying to do
- Example: I may browse the web, grade labs, and administer a web server
  - Create a role for each, with different privileges
  - My grader role may not have network access, except to sakai and gradescope
  - My web browsing role may not have access to my home directory files
  - My admin role and web roles can't access students' labs

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Roles vs. Restricted Context

- Win2k ACLs allow a user to create processes with a subset of his/her privileges
- Roles provide the same functionality
  - But also allow a user to **add** privileges, such as administrative rights
- Roles may also have policy restrictions on who/when/how roles are changed
  - Not just anyone (or any program) can get admin privileges

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The power of RBAC

- Conditional access control
- Example: Don't let this file go out on the internet
  - Create secret file role
    - No network access, can't write any files except other secret files
    - Process cannot change roles, only exit
    - Process can read secret files
  - I challenge you to express this policy in Unix permissions!

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Roles vs. Specific Users

- Policies are hard to write
- Roles allow policies to be generalized
  - Users everywhere want similar restrictions on their browser
- Roles eliminate the need to re-tailor the policy file for every user
  - Anyone can transition to the browser role

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Type Enforcement

- Very much like the fine-grained ACLs we saw last time
- Rather than everything being a file, objects are given a more specific type
  - Type includes a set of possible actions on the object
    - E.g., Socket: create, listen, send, recv, close
  - Type includes ACLs based on roles

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Type examples

- Device types:
  - agp_device_t - AGP device (/dev/agpgart)
  - console_device_t - Console device (/dev/console)
  - mouse_device_t - Mouse (/dev/mouse)
- File types:
  - fs_t - Defaults file type
  - etc_aliases_t - /etc/aliases and related files
  - bin_t - Files in /bin

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More type examples

- Networking:
  - netif_eth0_t – Interface eth0
  - port_t – TCP/IP port
  - tcp_socket_t – TCP socket
- /proc types
  - proc_t - /proc and related files
  - sysctl_t - /proc/sys and related files
  - sysctl_fs_t - /proc/sys/fs and related files

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Detailed example

- ping_exec_t type associated with ping binary
- Policies for ping_exec_t:
  - Restrict who can transition into ping_t domain
    - Admins for sure, and init scripts
    - Regular users: admin can configure
  - ping_t domain (executing process) allowed to:
    - Use shared libraries
    - Use the network
    - Call ypbind (for hostname lookup in YP/NIS)

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Ping cont.

- ping_t domain process can also:
  - Read certain files in /etc
  - Create Unix socket streams
  - Create raw ICMP sockets + send/recv on them on any interface
  - Access the terminal
  - Get file system attributes and search /var (mostly harmless operations that would pollute the logs if disallowed)
  - setuid (again, backwards compatibility)
    - The last two violate least privilege to avoid modification!

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Full ping policy

```
type ping_t, domain, privlog;
type ping_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
role sysadm_r types ping_t;
role system_r types ping_t;

# Transition into this domain when you run this program.
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, ping_exec_t, ping_t)
domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, ping_exec_t, ping_t)

uses_shlib(ping_t)
can_network(ping_t)
general_domain_access(ping_t)
allow ping_t { etc_t resolv_conf_t }:file { getattr read };
allow ping_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;

# Let ping create raw ICMP packets.
allow ping_t self:rawip_socket {create ioctl read write bind getopt setopt};
allow ping_t any_socket_t:rawip_socket sendto;

auditallow ping_t any_socket_t:rawip_socket sendto;

# Let ping receive ICMP replies.
allow ping_t { self icmp_socket_t }:rawip_socket recvfrom;

# Use capabilities.
allow ping_t self:capability { net_raw setuid };

# Access the terminal.
allow ping_t admin_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow ping_t sysadm_gph_t:fd use;')
allow ping_t privfd:fd use;

dontaudit ping_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;

# it tries to access /var/run
dontaudit ping_t var_t:dir search;
```

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Linux Security Modules

- Culturally, top Linux developers care about writing a good kernel
  - Not as much about security
  - Different specializations
- Their goal: Modularize security as much as humanly possible
  - Security folks write modules that you can load if you care about security; kernel developers don't have to worry about understanding security

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Basic deal

- Linux Security Modules API:
  - Linux developers put dozens of access control hooks all over the kernel
    - See include/linux/security.h
  - LSM writer can implement access control functions called by these hooks that enforce arbitrary policies
  - Linux also adds opaque "security" pointer that LSM can use to store security info they need in processes, inodes, sockets, etc.

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SELinux example

- A task has an associated security pointer
  - Stores current role
- An inode also has a security pointer
  - Stores type and policy rules
- Initialization hooks for both called when created

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SELinux example, cont.

- A task reads the inode
  - VFS function calls LSM hook, with inode and task pointer
  - LSM reads policy rules from inode
- Suppose the file requires a role transition for read
  - LSM hook modifies task's security data to change its role
  - Then read allowed to proceed

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Problem: Persistence

- All of these security hooks are great for *in memory* data structures
  - E.g., VFS inodes
- How do you ensure the policy associated with a given file persists across reboots?

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Extended Attributes

- In addition to 9+ standard Unix attributes, associate a small key/value store with an on-disk inode
  - User can tag a file with arbitrary metadata
  - Key must be a string, prefixed with a domain
    - User, trusted, system, security
  - Users must use 'user' domain
  - LSM uses 'security' domain
- Only a few file systems support extended attributes
  - E.g., ext2/3/4; not NFS, FAT32

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Persistence

- All ACLs, type information, etc. are stored in extended attributes for persistence
- Each file must be *labeled* for MAC enforcement
  - Labeling is the generic problem of assigning a type or security context to each object/file in the system
  - Can be complicated
- SELinux provides some tools to help, based on standard system file names and educated guesses

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Summary

- SELinux augments Linux with a much more restrictive security model
  - MAC vs. DAC
- Understand Roles and Types
- Basic ideas of LSM
  - Labeling and extended attributes

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